Economy & Market
A perfect distribution?
Published
11 years agoon
By
admin
The distribution of cement to the end user from the manufacturer is a major cost factor in the landed cost of cement at the user end. ICR takes a look at the major obstacles in cement distribution.
Till 80s cement was available only as a commodity, and the production and distribution of cement was controlled by the Government. One had to apply to a district collector to get cement allotted for a job. It is only during the late 80s that cement was decontrolled and as a result many players entered into cement production, triggering competition into the cement industry.
It has been almost 28 years since cement has been decontrolled. Since then industry has witnessed high level of competition which has forced all the players to create their brand image in the minds of the customer so they can fetch premium price over competitors. But slowly all the companies have started replicating the activities undertaken by any pioneer company and so the companies were forced to control their cost in order to ensure reasonable profits during the lean period, i.e., when the demand is low and prices are under pressure. It is important to note the recent development of selling cement through online shops like Snapdeal, etc.
Mechanics of distribution channels
Companies invariably hire carry and forwarding agents (CFAs) to transport cement to their own or dealers? warehouses, which is either done via road or railways. From CFAs or warehouses, the cement is then transported to dealers/distributors and further to sub dealers who finally sell it to the end user. The physical ownership of goods every time does not get transferred. In the other case, dealers and sub dealers take order from buyers and place it to the companies, distributors coordinate and monitor for the timely dispatch of said orders, transportation of goods and final delivery and in return get their commission. It must be borne in mind that it is high volume and low margin business as stated by both – Nikhil Phadke, Partner, Vaidya & Co, and Senan Shah, Om Swastik Trading.
Distributor network in cement industry is highly dominating, and companies are compelled to hire the services as they rarely have any rapport or contact with the end consumer of their product. Apart from this, distributors have storage facilities, which enable them to control the supply chain. Therefore it becomes an important link in the business chain.
Three major factors affect the cost of cement. These include: logistic (20 to 22 per cent), excise and VAT of which excise and VAT are Government duties and thus cannot be controlled by the manufacturer. So only cost that is in the hands of manufacturer is the logistic cost, and in order to reduce the logistic cost, the companies try to sell their production in the nearby areas.
Moreover as the cement plant has to be installed nearby limestone deposits, plants of various companies are located very near to each other. This creates an intense competition in the nearby areas as all the companies try to sell their product with minimal logistic cost. Largely this is applicable to all the cement plants but as the big companies have huge production capacity at the single plant they have low cost of production and so they can afford to distribute their product at far off places at a slightly higher price. But the small players have limited production capacity so they try to increase their profits by saving on the logistic cost by selling in a limited area, and this technique of saving on logistic cost is shrinking their area of operation. This can be experienced in the states of Telangana and Andhra Pradesh. Thus intense competition is experienced in local areas as big players have to sell some part of their production in local area to get higher realisation and the local companies have to sell in local areas as they cannot afford to sell in far-off places due to increasing logistic cost. Moreover the transportation cost always has an increasing trend, so every company prefers to sell their maximum possible production in the nearby area which increases competition to a great extent.
Today we can say, in all the developed countries, cement is still treated as a commodity whereas in India it is somewhere between commodity and brand. In short, for a retail buyer, companies sell it as a brand whereas for institutional buyers it is sold as a commodity. The dealer is extremely important for both buyer and manufacturer.
Distribution Channel: Cement v/s FMCG
The business is driven on relationship more than that of a brand. The market is extremely price-sensitive and therefore the brand cannot fetch a value beyond a certain level. Typically the institutional buyers squeeze the manufacturers and dealers to a maximum. The systems of payment and collection are better in FMCG sector than that of cement. The channel has to improve on that. Many a times as referred by Phadke, deliveries are effected just on telephone calls without any documentation and dealers have been exposed to a great risk. Probably the younger generation has to learn from it and correct their actions.
According to Rahul Akkara, Associate Vice President – Brand, JSW Cement, "In the cement business, the dealer is accountable for expanding the base across his/her territory and for doing this, he/she needs to have a good sub dealer base, which would help him achieve this. Also the dealer should also have good networking with influencers such as contractors, engineers, masons and builders, who are also equally responsible to increase business for a cement brand in his territory."
Exclusivity so called is meaningless and forced only by the companies even though they understand that exclusive dealers are doing business with other brands, may be in equal volumes only under different names. Secondly as expressed by Phadke, it is not legally enforceable but still cement companies are going on creating exclusive dealers. It needs second thinking.
Cement bags does not carry an expiry date but it does not mean that the old stock can be put to use for any job like casting a slab or column. Here it differs far from that of FMCG products and procedures. Leftover or damaged products are returned to the manufacturers, however it does not apply to cement. Another major difference with that of FMCG products is that the manufacturer scores over that of the distributor and he is dominant where as in cement business chain the dealer is more valued than the manufacturer.
The other issue raised by Phadke is very valid but has no immediate answer. CFAs are becoming cement dealers and competing with traditional channel members. It is important to remember that as CFAs have access to very vital information about the dealers customers and that can be used to compete with them. Even legally it will not be possible for any one to stop such entry but what can be done is they can be allotted different territory for doing business so as to protect the interest of the existing dealers. On the other hand some of the existing dealers have been investing money to have their own transport but it has not been very common.
Surprisingly no one has talked about the loss of cement either by the way of using hooks or because of transloading of shipment. The quantum of loss is significant but since it is a high volume business no one seems to be worried.
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Concrete
UltraTech Cement expands green logistics with 600+ electric truck fleet
Published
3 days agoon
September 3, 2026By
admin
The e-truck fleet will be used to transport five million MT of clinker and other key materials with potential of over 1,17,000 tonnes of net annual CO₂ reduction, displacing the equivalent of 39 million litres of diesel per year.
Mumbai
UltraTech Cement Limited, an Aditya Birla Group company and the world’s largest cement company by sales volume and capacity outside China, has announced that it will scale up its electric vehicle fleet in its logistics operations to 600+ EV trucks by December 2026.
UltraTech has signed service contracts with leading EV prime mover manufacturers including Tata Motors, Ashok Leyland, IPLTech, Energy in Motion and Sany, along with their subsidiaries and other third-party logistics providers, to deploy EV trucks.
The total fleet of 600+ EV trucks will transport about five million MT of clinker and other key materials per annum across Gujarat, Uttar Pradesh, Madhya Pradesh, Rajasthan, Chhattisgarh, Maharashtra and Odisha. Once fully operational, this fleet of over 600 EV trucks will enable a net annual CO₂ reduction of more than 1,17,000 tonnes, displacing the equivalent of 39 million litres of diesel per year.
K C Jhanwar, Managing Director, UltraTech Cement Limited, said, “UltraTech is expanding sustainability beyond its plants by adopting greener logistics solutions. This large-scale transition to green logistics underscores our focus on decarbonising every link of our value chain and supports our commitment to achieving Net Zero.”
UltraTech has been a pioneer in advancing sustainable transport in the cement sector, being the first cement company to deploy heavy-duty electric trucks for long-haul transport of clinker and other materials at scale. The company was among the first in India to introduce green logistics, deploying CNG trucks in 2021 and electric trucks in 2024. UltraTech currently operates 850+ trucks as part of its green logistics operations, including CNG and electric trucks.
UltraTech, with a grey cement capacity of over 200 MTPA in India, operates one of the country’s most complex logistics networks. Its electrification strategy covers the entire supply chain—from mine-to-plant movement to inter-plant transport of clinker and other key materials.
The $ 10 billion UltraTech, the cement flagship company of the Aditya Birla Group, has a total Grey Cement capacity of 205.5 MTPA and White Cement/Putty capacity of 3.2 MTPA. It is a signatory to the GCCA Climate Ambition 2050 and has committed to the Net Zero Concrete roadmap announced by GCCA.
In a research-backed article, Dr SB Hegde examines why carbon-adjusted profitability and LC3 will decide the next set of winners in cement manufacturing.
The Indian cement industry has achieved world-class operational efficiency through lower specific energy consumption, high plant utilisation and a reduced average clinker factor of approximately 67.5 per cent. These traditional measures of operational excellence remain essential. However, they are no longer sufficient. Carbon now carries a measurable financial cost under India’s Carbon Credit Trading Scheme (CCTS) and under European carbon markets. Future leadership will be defined by carbon-adjusted profitability, the ability to generate strong returns while systematically lowering the carbon intensity of every ton sold.
Limestone calcined clay cement (LC3) offers a practical, scalable pathway to achieve this dual objective. By replacing up to 50 per cent of clinker with calcined clay and limestone, LC3 can reduce CO2 emissions by 30–40 per cent while delivering comparable or superior durability performance.
This article examines the technical foundations of LC3, European industrial practices, the emerging Indian carbon market and a concrete roadmap for Indian companies to embed carbon-adjusted metrics and LC3 into daily operations, incentives and commercial strategy.
Limits of traditional operational excellence
For many years, plant performance has been judged primarily by five indicators: specific heat consumption, specific power consumption, kiln and mill utilisation, clinker factor and overall equipment effectiveness. These metrics drove continuous improvement and helped the industry reduce energy use and increase the share of blended cement. Three structural changes have rendered them incomplete as sole measures of success.
First, carbon now carries a real or opportunity cost. Plants that improve volume or lower cash cost while raising or stagnating emissions intensity create a hidden liability that will surface as CCTS trading matures and as green procurement expands.
Second, lower-carbon products such as LC3 and high-performance blended cements are creating differentiated market segments. Customers in infrastructure, real estate and export-oriented construction are beginning to specify embodied-carbon limits.
Third, investors and lenders increasingly treat carbon intensity as a financial risk factor. Traditional KPIs can mask the divergence between short-term cash profit and long-term carbon-adjusted value.
What is carbon-adjusted profitability?
Carbon-adjusted profitability evaluates normal profit after explicit adjustment for carbon performance. A practical expression is:
Carbon-Adjusted EBITDA = Conventional EBITDA – Carbon Cost + Green Premium Income
Carbon cost may be an internal carbon price, the actual cost of purchasing Carbon Credit Certificates under CCTS, or the opportunity cost of high emissions relative to peers. Green premium income arises when customers pay more for verified lower-carbon cement or when the company sells surplus credits. Tracking both conventional and carbon-adjusted profit side-by-side gives management a clearer picture of value creation under evolving market rules.
Table 1. Traditional KPIs versus Carbon-Adjusted Leadership Metrics
Traditional Focus New Leadership Metric Why It Matters
Specific energy consumption Emissions intensity (kg CO2/t cement) Directly linked to future CCTS and CBAM costs
Kiln utilisation Carbon-adjusted contribution margin Reveals true value of incremental volume
Clinker factor Share of lower-carbon products sold (incl. LC3) Measures commercial success of the transition
Power cost per tonne Effective carbon cost per tonne sold Expose hidden liabilities
Absolute EBITDA Carbon-adjusted EBITDA + green premium Aligning profit with future market reality
LC3: Technical foundations and performance advantages
LC3 is a ternary blended cement that typically combines approximately 50 per cent clinker, 30 per cent calcined clay, 15 per cent limestone and 5 per cent gypsum (the classic LC3-50 formulation). The decisive technical advantage is that clay is calcined at 700–850 °C, far below the 1,450 °C required for clinker production. This lower temperature, together with the substantial reduction in clinker content, delivers CO2 reductions of 30–40 per cent relative to ordinary Portland cement (OPC).
Chemistry is synergistic. Calcined kaolinitic clay (metakaolin) reacts with calcium hydroxide from clinker hydration and with limestone to form additional C-A-S-H gel and carboaluminate phases. These phases densify the microstructure, reduce porosity and improve durability.
Field experience shows superior resistance to chloride ingress, sulphate attack and alkali–silica reaction. Early-age strength can match OPC with high-reactivity clays; later-age strengths routinely meet 42.5 and 52.5 grade requirements.
Importantly, LC3 does not require high-purity kaolin. Clays with 40 per cent or even lower kaolinite content can be activated successfully, expanding raw-material availability across India. Calcination can use adapted rotary kilns or dedicated flash calciners, making the technology compatible with existing plant infrastructure and far less capital-intensive than carbon capture.
Economic analyses show that LC3 can be produced at equal or lower cost than OPC in many locations because of reduced energy demand and cheaper clay. Life-cycle assessments consistently report 30–40 per cent lower embodied CO2 per tonne of cement.
Table 2. Comparative profile: OPC versus LC3-50
Parameter OPC LC3-50
Typical clinker content ~95 per cent ~50 per cent
CO2 emissions (relative) Baseline (≈0.85 t CO2/t cement process + fuel) 30–40 per cent lower
Clay calcination temperature Not applicable 700–850 °C
Key hydration products C-S-H, portlandite, ettringite C-A-S-H + carboaluminates
Chloride & sulphate resistance Good Superior
Production cost potential Baseline Equal or lower in most locations
Infrastructure compatibility Existing High (minor adaptations)
In India, commercial adoption has begun in earnest. JK Cement commenced the first commercial production of LC3 in the Indian subcontinent at its Mangrol plant in Rajasthan in 2025 under BIS standard IS 18189.
By early 2026, approximately 2,000 tonnes had been produced and sold, avoiding an estimated 500 tonnes of CO2. JK Lakshmi Cement followed with commercial launch of its Green PRO LC3 grade from the Jaykaypuram plant. As of mid-2026, two producers are supplying LC3 to the market. The first large-scale infrastructure application is the Noida International Airport (Jewar), where LC3 was used in the runway and a building complex, demonstrating full constructability and performance under demanding conditions. These early volumes are still small relative to national cement demand, but they mark the critical transition from pilot to commercial reality. Companies that scale capacity now will be positioned to capture both CCTS credits and emerging green-procurement demand.
Why the shift is accelerating
According to the World Bank’s State and Trends of Carbon Pricing 2026, direct carbon pricing now covers nearly 30 per cent of global greenhouse-gas emissions and generated more than US$107 billion in public revenue in 2025. The average global carbon price stands at approximately US$21 per tonne, although regional prices vary widely.
In Europe, the EU ETS price has traded near €80–85 per tonen in mid-2026. Free allocation for cement is being withdrawn in parallel with CBAM. European producers therefore face a clear signal: every tonne of avoided CO2 improves both compliance and competitiveness. Holcim has scaled calcined-clay production, including Europe’s first dedicated line at Saint-Pierre-la-Cour (France) and a second line in the Czech Republic (2026). Heidelberg Materials, Cementir (FUTURECEM) and others have commercialised low-clinker calcined-clay blends across multiple markets, showing that carbon-adjusted profitability is already reshaping capital allocation in the world’s most mature carbon market.India’s CCTS is now operational. Binding emission intensity targets apply to 186 cement facilities for FY 2025–26 and FY 2026–27. Average required reductions for integrated plants are modest (around 2.7 per cent by FY 2027), yet the direction is clear.
Trading of Carbon Credit Certificates is expected in the second half of 2026, with early prices likely in the `800–1,500 per tonne range. Plants that outperform targets can sell credits; those that underperform must buy them or face compensation. Cement is well positioned to be a net supplier of credits if clinker factor continues to fall through LC3 and other low-clinker systems.
Way forward for India
India starts from a strong baseline, world-class energy efficiency and a clinker factor already lower than the global average. The next competitive frontier is the deliberate reduction of process emissions through clinker substitution at scale. LC3 is uniquely suited to Indian conditions because suitable clays are widely distributed, the technology fits existing kiln and grinding infrastructure, and the resulting product can meet the performance demands of both infrastructure and building construction.
A practical national pathway contains five interlocking elements:
- Standards and acceptance: Accelerated finalisation and promotion of BIS specifications for calcined-clay and limestone–calcined-clay cements will remove a key barrier to commercial uptake. Alignment with European practice (EN 197-5) can facilitate knowledge transfer and export readiness.
- Supply-chain development: Investment in flash calcination capacity and systematic characterisation of regional clay deposits will secure reliable, low-cost feedstock. Existing rotary kilns can be adapted for initial volumes while dedicated calciners are built.
- Incentive alignment: Part of variable compensation for plant managers, sales teams and senior leadership should be linked to emissions intensity reduction and to the volume of lower-carbon products (including LC3) sold. Without this link, traditional volume and cost targets will continue to dominate behaviour.
- Product-level carbon accounting: Reliable measurement of emissions intensity at the individual cement grade level, supported by third-party verification where required, is essential for both CCTS compliance and credible green claims.
- Demand-side pull: Green public procurement policies that specify maximum embodied-carbon thresholds for major infrastructure projects will create a predictable market for LC3 and other low-carbon cements, accelerating scale and cost reduction.
Companies that treat LC3 as a strategic product line rather than a niche offering will be better positioned to generate surplus Carbon Credit Certificates, capture any emerging green premium, and protect margins as carbon costs rise.
Organisational changes required
Technical capability alone is insufficient. Three organisational shifts are required.
Daily management: Emissions intensity must appear on the same daily and monthly dashboards as heat consumption, power consumption and utilization. Plant reviews should examine both conventional and carbon-adjusted results.
Incentives: A meaningful portion of bonuses for plant heads, technical teams and sales leadership should be tied to lower emissions intensity and successful commercialisation of LC3 and other low-carbon grades.
Commercial approach: Sales teams need clear volume and pricing targets for lower-carbon products, supported by technical service that helps customers specify and place the material correctly. Without commercial pull, excellent technical performance remains under-utilised.
Table 3. Three-stage roadmap to carbon-adjusted profitability
Time Horizon Priority Actions Expected Outcome
Next 12 months Add emissions intensity to plant dashboards; establish internal carbon price; initiate LC3 pilot production and customer trials Visibility and early organisational learning
12–24 months Revise incentive systems; scale LC3 and other low-carbon grades to key accounts; secure third-party verification capability People and sales aligned with carbon goals
24–36 months Embed carbon-adjusted metrics in board reporting and capital allocation; expand calcined-clay capacity Full system integration and competitive advantage
Questions senior leaders should ask
Boards can accelerate the transition by insisting on answers to a short list of questions:
• Is our carbon-adjusted profit improving, stable or declining relative to conventional EBITDA?
• Did recent volume growth improve or worsen our emissions intensity?
• What share of sales already comes from lower-carbon products, including LC3, and what is the trajectory?
• How exposed is our capital expenditure plan to rising carbon costs under CCTS and potential CBAM-related requirements?
• Do our incentive systems still reward only volume and cost, or have they been updated to include carbon performance?
Treating carbon with the same seriousness as energy cost or kiln utilization does not diminish operational excellence; it expands the definition of excellence to match the new competitive reality.
Looking ahead
By 2030 the gap between leading and lagging cement companies will not be decided by who records the lowest specific heat consumption. It will be decided by who delivers the strongest carbon-adjusted profits.
Absolute emissions may still rise as national production grows. That is not the issue. Companies that reduce intensity year after year and successfully sell cleaner products will pull ahead in both domestic and export markets. Those that do not will fall behind, even if their traditional efficiency numbers look strong.
Operational excellence built the Indian cement industry. It remains the foundation. It is no longer the complete picture. Carbon-adjusted profitability is the clearer measure of success.
LC3 is not a distant technology. It is available now. It cuts CO3 by 30–40 per cent, works with existing plants, and is already in commercial production in India. Companies that treat it as a strategic product, not a pilot, will protect their margins and generate tradable credits.
Leaders who act now will place carbon metrics on daily dashboards, link incentives to intensity reduction and LC3 sales, invest in calcined-clay capacity, and build commercial capability to sell lower-carbon products. They will shape the next chapter of the industry.
References
- World Bank. (2026). State and Trends of Carbon Pricing 2026. Washington, DC: World Bank Group.
- International Carbon Action Partnership (ICAP). (2026). India Carbon Credit Trading Scheme – Status and Coverage. Berlin: ICAP.
- Ministry of Environment, Forest and Climate Change / Bureau of Energy Efficiency. (2025). Greenhouse Gases Emission Intensity Target Rules, 2025. New Delhi: Government of India.
- Scrivener, K., Martirena, F., Bishnoi, S., & Maity, S. (2018). Calcined clay limestone cements (LC3). Cement and Concrete Research, 114, 49–56.
- RMI. (2024). The Business Case for LC3. Rocky Mountain Institute.
- European Commission. (2026). EU Emissions Trading System – Allowance Price Data and Free Allocation Phase-out Schedule. Brussels.
- Holcim. (2025–2026). Scaling Calcined Clay for Sustainable Building – Corporate Updates on European and Latin American Capacity. Zurich: Holcim Ltd.
- LC3 Project / EPFL. (2026). LC3 – A Guide to Best Practices for Scalable, Affordable and Sustainable Low-Carbon Building. Lausanne: École Polytechnique Fédérale de Lausanne.
- Business Today / Industry Reports. (2026). First Large-Scale LC3 Application at Noida International Airport, Jewar. New Delhi.
- NITI Aayog / Industry Analyses. (2026). Roadmap and Baseline Performance Indicators for the Indian Cement Sector. New Delhi.
- Springer / Innovative Infrastructure Solutions. (2026). LC3 Systems: A Review of Chemistry, Performance, Durability and Sustainability toward Market Adoption.
- Cementir Holding / Industry Sources. (2025–2026). FUTURECEM and Related Low-Clinker Technologies in Europe.
- Climate Risk Horizons & Independent Analyses. (2026). Assessment of Emission Intensity Targets under India’s CCTS for Cement and Other Hard-to-Abate Sectors.
- GCCA / TERI. (Various years). Decarbonization Roadmaps for the Indian Cement Industry.
- EN 197-5:2021. Cement – Part 5: Portland-composite cement CEM II/C-M and Composite cement CEM VI. European Committee for Standardization.
Concrete
More Oversight Makes Cement Plants Less Safe
Published
1 week agoon
August 28, 2026By
admin
Dijam Panigrahi makes a counterintuitive but data-backed argument that routing every sensor alert through human approval does not make cement plants safer.
India’s cement industry has spent the last two years wiring kilns, mills and coolers with sensors and automated control systems, and the safety case for doing so is strong on paper. Contract workers still make up the majority of the industry’s workforce, and fatal accidents remain a recurring problem. The Indian National Cement Workers Federation has noted that around 83 per cent of workers in the sector hold precarious positions, a fact that resurfaced after an oxygen cylinder explosion killed three contract workers at a plant in Chhattisgarh.
Industry tallies compiled by IndustriALL found cement plants recorded at least seventeen accidents in one year with 21 workers killed, and ten accidents the following year with nine killed, most of them contract staff. Automated monitoring, in theory, closes that gap. A sensor never gets complacent and never skips a check because a shift is short staffed.
However, plants that respond by routing every anomaly reading to a person for approval are quietly building a system that fails the same way understaffing does. When operators receive dozens of flagged deviations a shift, most of them minor, they learn a simple lesson: the fastest way through the queue is to approve without reading closely. The safety benefit disappears, not because the technology failed, but because the humans supervising it adapted to the volume.
Why alerts get ignored
A study cited by manufacturing technology publisher Applied SmartFactory found more than 95 per cent of alarms in a semiconductor fab were low priority, and only about 4 per cent ever triggered an action, with just 100 out of 5,000 alarms accounting for 70 per cent of all alarm activity. The mechanism is the same whether the trigger is a vibration sensor or an AI model flagging a kiln temperature swing. Once the ratio of noise to signal crosses a threshold, workers stop treating the system as a decision aid and start treating it as a formality to clear.
The scale of AI deployment underway makes this more than a theoretical risk. Stanford’s 2026 AI Index Report found organisational adoption of AI has reached 88 per cent, even as documented AI incidents rose to 362 in 2025, up sharply from 233 the year before, according to analysis of the report. The Index also found only about a third of organisations have adopted a formal governance framework, with NIST’s AI Risk Management Framework cited by 33 per cent and ISO/IEC 42001 cited by 36 per cent.
Most manufacturers are deploying monitoring systems faster than they are building the judgment for when a flagged event actually needs a person’s attention. In India, plants run by JK Cement have begun pairing CCTV feeds with AI to define safe zones around heavy machinery, a promising direction that still depends on operators trusting and reading the alerts the system generates.
A three-tier model for cement plant
The fix is not less monitoring or more monitoring. It is classifying decisions by risk and by novelty, rather than treating human oversight as a single switch that is either on or off. A workable model sorts factory floor events into three tiers.
The first tier, proceed, covers deviations the plant has seen before that fall within known safe bounds, such as a kiln feed rate adjustment within an established range. These should run without a stop for approval, because routing them to a person only trains that person to click through.
The second tier, pause, covers events that are unusual but not yet dangerous, such as a vibration reading trending toward a limit or a fuel blend shifting outside its typical mix. These warrant a brief human check before the system proceeds, giving an operator the chance to apply judgment the model does not yet have.
The third tier, escalate, covers events that are both high risk and unfamiliar, such as a pressure reading combined with a temperature spike that has no close precedent in the plant’s history. These should stop the process entirely and require a decision from someone with the authority to shut down a line.
Who should set the threshold
Where these tiers get drawn matters as much as the framework itself. Threshold setting is frequently handed to the vendor supplying the monitoring software or to a plant’s IT department, both of which understand the technology but not the specific tolerances of a given kiln, mill or line. Operations staff, who know that a particular grinding unit runs hotter under monsoon humidity or that a calciner behaves differently after a refractory reline, are better positioned to calibrate what counts as routine on their own equipment.
Handing threshold ownership to operations does not remove IT or vendors from the process, but it puts the calibration decision closest to the people who live with its consequences on the floor.
Signals that oversight is actually working
A few concrete indicators reveal whether a monitoring setup is functioning as intended or simply providing the appearance of safety. The escalation rate over time is the first: a rate that stays flat or climbs slowly as operations mature is healthy, while one that spikes and then falls sharply often means operators have started overriding the system rather than engaging with it. Time to resolution is the second: escalations that take progressively longer to close suggest fatigue or confusion about ownership, not diligence. The third, and most telling, is how accurate the system’s own uncertainty estimates turn out to be, meaning whether events flagged as high risk actually correlated with real incidents, and whether events waved through stayed incident free. A system whose escalations do not track with actual outcomes trains operators toward the same complacency that unmonitored equipment produces.
None of this argues against automation in Indian cement manufacturing, where a labor structure built on contract work and a track record of serious accidents make better monitoring an urgent need. It argues for treating human oversight as a design problem with three distinct settings, rather than a single
dial turned up whenever a plant wants to look safer on paper.
About the author:
Dijam Panigrahi, Co-founder and COO, GridRaster, is a spatial computing platform for industrial enterprises and manufacturers.
UltraTech to Deploy 600+ Electric Trucks by Dec 2026
UltraTech Cement expands green logistics with 600+ electric truck fleet
CarbonStrong Raises Rs 125 Million To Scale Low Carbon Cement Tech
Protect Your Margins
More Oversight Makes Cement Plants Less Safe
UltraTech to Deploy 600+ Electric Trucks by Dec 2026
UltraTech Cement expands green logistics with 600+ electric truck fleet
CarbonStrong Raises Rs 125 Million To Scale Low Carbon Cement Tech
Protect Your Margins

