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Failures of ?Gearbox and Drives?

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It is a pain area for the plant management team when the gear drive fails and it is more difficult to arrive at the correct cause of failure. S Sengupta & A Ray Chowdhury from Sprat Consultancy elaborates on some of the common causes of failures, also suggests remedial measures.

The idea of putting pen to paper regarding gear drives seems to be a daunting task. One is apprehensive as to where to begin and to what degree to write is a nerve racking proposition as majority of the readers are qualified, sound practical engineers who are associated with industrial plants such as cement, power, metals, etc. Experience confirms that a meaningful insight on the subject requires around three working days and if fourth day could be added by way of site visit with discussions on practical problems, works out a ?win-win? situation for all.

An endeavour is however being made to jot down some thoughts that may serve as pre curser from selection to use of drives. The order of narration is not sacrosanct and not all encompassing. It is just a brief write up on few attributes hoping it will provoke the mind of concerned personnel be it users or project/technical personnel. Use of gear drives in a system does not imply just operational; it encompasses what happens within a drive train and requirements to achieve desired performance life hence design life.

In many instances over the past 38 years, we have come across failures in drives caused by lack of insight or foresight or lack of correct data or its understanding during selection of drive. A common failure, but not frequent, is lack of perception of what all is to be handled &/or power required to drive the system.

An example that readily comes to mind is in a greenfield cement plant around early 1980s: the external consultant confirmed motor power, application, operating hours per day, etc. and wanted a drive with a safety factor (SF) of 2.5. This particular gear drive was 1 amongst 65 others. It was the only one that was prone to frequent failure to the tune of once every three months. Review of actual operating data confirmed actual power consumed was 40 per cent higher than confirmed during project design & planning leading to premature failures.

Another instance of premature failures observed in a cement plant in Western India of a twin drive bucket elevator where input drive was through fluid coupling. After a year of satisfactory operation failures commenced with regularity in one of the gear drives in the arrangement. As they were imported gearboxes not much hue and cry was raised initially. Replacements from two indigenous producers also failed in the same manner and frequency leading to a pantomime at the plant. Analysis of the drive arrangement confirmed power consumed by individual drives differed by over six per cent. In such a scenario, failure was inevitable and plant further confirmed that after a year one drive motor had burnt out requiring rewinding. Rewinding is common accepted process but what is equally important is that in a twin drive synchronisation of input power is of utmost importance of within two per cent variance. Since synchronise of input power no further failures occurred over a decade.

There are many other instances of failures we often recollect as observed over the last four decades. In all instances failures have taken place for:

  • Incomplete or inadequate clarity of specification at initial stage.
  • Lack of appreciation of specification, which is more dangerous.
  • Hypothesis by OEM of likely operational parameters viz a viz specification thus incorrect supply.
  • Augmenting capacity after year/s of use and not sharing data with supplier or supplier not appreciating information conveyed which must be well defined.

In short whatever are the circumstances in life (we consider gear drives also a form of life) it takes two to speak the truth to form an understanding and thus realisation. In the field of machine dynamics the same applies; dialogue between user and supplier must be continual and without inhibition or prejudice. In other words partnership is required with frank exchanges, irrespective of how insignificant the information may appear, to eliminate misgivings consequently failures.

The more this realisation dawns on all in a B2B scenario and quicker the better for all concerned resulting in reliability of operations. Failures are phenomena that cannot be totally ruled out even with best intentions of user and supplier. Any failure, irrespective of its occurrence, within or beyond the warranty period or after extended period of use is relevant at all times towards better and improved designs unless failure occurs beyond design life of rolling elements. This information should be shared with factual details unambiguously.

It is common for most designers to design critical drives, irrespective of type/size &/or application considering a life of 100,000 hours for gears/pinions and around 60,000 hours for bearings. Indirectly, to a large extent, bearing life sets the set point for case hardened and ground gears/pinions although theoretically it has an infinite life.

The question therefore arises why premature failures occur within warranty period or shortly thereafter. One of the primary reasons for failure beyond warranty period is governed by the quality of lubricating oil being used. Often quality is misunderstood with viscosity grade. Quality per ?say? has no relation to viscosity grade; it refers to the cleanliness of the oil.

  • Lubricating oil needs to be maintained clean and the desired level is NAS6 for industrial application other than turbine drives. This value of NAS6 also applies to wind mill drives and speed increasers as opposed to high speed drives. The cleanliness value of NAS6 does not readily register with users and to some extent with suppliers of gear drives. To put it mildly, check oil directly from a sealed barrel supplied by OEM for its NAS value and you will invariably find it anywhere around NAS10 or worse. Do not assume it happens only with indigenous supplies as it is far from the truth. Checks conducted with top brand sealed oil drums, indigenous or imported, confirm this is normal and common.
  • The onus thus lies with users to appreciate why oil cleaning is required and how does it improve the performance as well as life of the gear drive. It is safe to conclude, which concurs with our observation, that organisation which maintains lubricating oils health is less prone to premature failures. They invariably enhance the life of their drives by any where up to 30% higher than others for same drive conditions. This phenomena can be observed in an organisation &/or plant to plant operations but sadly data and findings are rarely pooled.
  • Another disturbing fact is often lubricating oil is procured on price consideration only and neglect issues such as scuffing, scoring, wet-ability etc properties.
  • Cost differential between normal mineral oil containing higher levels of sulphur and phosphorous in relation to vacuum distilled mineral oils is around 75-80 per cent more but the usable life of oil, if cleanliness maintained around NAS6, will justify the extra cost as life will be minimum double of normal mineral oil. A cement plant in Eastern India has continually achieved life of three times that of normal mineral oils there by not only resulting in huge savings to the organisation by way of less oil consumption and frequent shutdowns for changing oil.
  • Do note, normal mineral oils with higher levels of sulphur and phosphorous have an greater affinity to absorb moisture from the atmosphere leading to formation of sulphuric & phosphoric acids; both are very harmful towards life of bearings, seals and last but not least internal preservative paints applied to gearbox housing walls adding to further contamination.
  • A question we need to ask our self, as buyers we seek guarantee and warranty at the drop of a hat then why not for lubricants used?
  • Another cause of failure beyond warranty period is the upkeep of breathers, seals, etc. along with external surface of the gear drive. Often it is neglected resulting in breathers getting choked &/or become an ingress point for dirt when drive is stopped. As a result we have oil seal leakages and oil contamination leading to premature failures. Such instances are quite common in conveyor drives of cement grinding section or packing plant, coal handling conveyors, etc. An excuse we at times come across for not maintaining minimal level of cleanliness is, it is not a critical drive! The same excuse is also conveyed when the gearbox is covered with dust. What fails to be appreciated by the user is damage is taking place to investments and it can has a cascading effect.
  • There are numerous other instances of failures beyond warranty period but this is nether the forum or place to address these issues.
  • Failures during warranty period can be generally summed up under following heads as trends prevailing in gear design are to raise power levels till it does not result in a failure while decreasing volumes thus weight leading to increasing problems of heat dissipation:
  • Faulty or inadequacy of design
  • Incorrect selection & use of materials for manufacture
  • Incorrect selection of bearing
  • Manufacturing errors
  • Heat treatment errors
  • Assembly errors
  • Fluctuating or incorrectly defined operating parameters
  • Variants from original specification supplied &/or contaminates
  • Use of improper or incorrect quality of lubricant

Very rarely only one of the above mentioned causes account for failure to gear drives thus understanding and assessing gear damage requires in-depth knowledge of:

  • Gear contact patterns
  • Gear tooth failure types and probable causes
  • Bearing failure types with probable reasons
  • Lubricating oils
  • Oil flow within the gear drives be it splash or forced lubrication, etc.

It is not feasible to go through all these aspects in depth through this short article but to create awareness towards minimising risks of premature failures. We as such recommend use of following documents as a starting point to improve performance of gear drives thus overall operations of a plant. The documents relate to what needs to be communicated to the prospective seller and what in return you must get from them without fail.

Info. to be given By gearbox manufacturer

1.With offer for critical drives:
Design calculation in details for safety wrt wear & strength confirming material grade, etc.

2.Along with general arrangement (GA) drawing after placement of order:

  • GA drawing for all gear units, unless otherwise agreed upon, that gives full details of all manufactured part numbers and full nomenclature of proprietary parts including prefix and suffix, if any.
  • Number of teeth of each pinion and gear to facilitate vibration analysis. ?Spare parts list that can be correlated with GA drawing & the part number.
  • Approximate weight of gearbox.
  • Direction of rotation of input and output shafts.
  • GD? value of critical drives.
  • In case of pressure lubrication system water and oil flow rates with pressure range. Should also specify water and oil temperature gradient envisaged between inlet and outlet.
  • In case of cooling coil water flow rate and temperature gradient envisaged between inlet and outlet.
  • Details of interlocking, if any required to be ensured.

Note:

  • Your requirements of above data should be incorporated in your tender or enquiry or most major manufacturers will refuse to comply with the request at a later date.
  • Data of number of teeth will not only facilitate vibration analysis personnel but may facilitate in rationalising spares inventory if similar gearboxes are available in the plant or if same series gearboxes are installed of sizes that are just smaller or bigger than that on order.
  • Information to be given By a client

Following information are required to be furnished along with enquiry to finalise drive:

1. Prime mover – confirm type with full details like kW, rpm, Hz, type etc:

  • Motor
  • Turbine
  • I.C. engine

2. Input coupling – specify which:

  • Pin bush type flexible
  • Geared coupling
  • Fluid coupling
  • Bibby coupling
  • Tyre coupling
  • Any other than that mentioned above?

Note:

  • If coupling is not in the scope of gearbox supplier then its type, make, bore with tolerance of half to be mounted on gearbox are to be furnished.
  • Coupling in scope of gearbox OEM then confirm motor shaft diameter & tolerance.

3. Input through belt pulley drive – confirm following:

  • Pitch circle diameters of pulleys?
  • Direction of rotation of input shaft looking towards it?
  • Type of pulleys?

Note:
Provide sketch showing disposition of pulleys with respect to gearbox with dimensions in vertical and horizontal plane.

4. Type of gear drive:

  • Configuration of gearbox required i.e. helical, bevel/helical, RH, LH etc.
  • Operating hours per day?
  • Minimum and maximum ambient temperature where it is installed?
  • Place of installation i.e. open space, small confined area or large workshop?
  • Environmental condition e.g. normal, dusty, etc.

Note:
Mention if any other speciality is required in the drive.

5. Output coupling – specify which:

  • Pin bush type flexible
  • Geared coupling
  • Any other than that mentioned above?

Note:

  • If coupling is not in the scope of gearbox supplier then its type, make, bore with tolerance of half to be mounted on gearbox are to be furnished.
  • Coupling in scope of gearbox OEM; confirm machine shaft diameter & tolerance.

6. Output through Sprocket Drive:

  • Pitch circle dia of sprockets?
  • Direction of rotation of output shaft looking towards it?
  • Maximum pull of chain?

Note:
Provide sketch showing disposition of sprockets with respect to gearbox with dimensions in vertical and horizontal plane.

7. Driven machine details:

  • Cement mill, coal mill, sugar mill, belt conveyor, kiln, etc.
  • Confirm if it is twin drive, etc.
  • If possible specify OEM details of equipment manufacturer.

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Concrete

Protect Your Margins

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In a research-backed article, Dr SB Hegde examines why carbon-adjusted profitability and LC3 will decide the next set of winners in cement manufacturing.

The Indian cement industry has achieved world-class operational efficiency through lower specific energy consumption, high plant utilisation and a reduced average clinker factor of approximately 67.5 per cent. These traditional measures of operational excellence remain essential. However, they are no longer sufficient. Carbon now carries a measurable financial cost under India’s Carbon Credit Trading Scheme (CCTS) and under European carbon markets. Future leadership will be defined by carbon-adjusted profitability, the ability to generate strong returns while systematically lowering the carbon intensity of every ton sold.
Limestone calcined clay cement (LC3) offers a practical, scalable pathway to achieve this dual objective. By replacing up to 50 per cent of clinker with calcined clay and limestone, LC3 can reduce CO2 emissions by 30–40 per cent while delivering comparable or superior durability performance.
This article examines the technical foundations of LC3, European industrial practices, the emerging Indian carbon market and a concrete roadmap for Indian companies to embed carbon-adjusted metrics and LC3 into daily operations, incentives and commercial strategy.

Limits of traditional operational excellence
For many years, plant performance has been judged primarily by five indicators: specific heat consumption, specific power consumption, kiln and mill utilisation, clinker factor and overall equipment effectiveness. These metrics drove continuous improvement and helped the industry reduce energy use and increase the share of blended cement. Three structural changes have rendered them incomplete as sole measures of success.
First, carbon now carries a real or opportunity cost. Plants that improve volume or lower cash cost while raising or stagnating emissions intensity create a hidden liability that will surface as CCTS trading matures and as green procurement expands.
Second, lower-carbon products such as LC3 and high-performance blended cements are creating differentiated market segments. Customers in infrastructure, real estate and export-oriented construction are beginning to specify embodied-carbon limits.
Third, investors and lenders increasingly treat carbon intensity as a financial risk factor. Traditional KPIs can mask the divergence between short-term cash profit and long-term carbon-adjusted value.

What is carbon-adjusted profitability?
Carbon-adjusted profitability evaluates normal profit after explicit adjustment for carbon performance. A practical expression is:
Carbon-Adjusted EBITDA = Conventional EBITDA – Carbon Cost + Green Premium Income
Carbon cost may be an internal carbon price, the actual cost of purchasing Carbon Credit Certificates under CCTS, or the opportunity cost of high emissions relative to peers. Green premium income arises when customers pay more for verified lower-carbon cement or when the company sells surplus credits. Tracking both conventional and carbon-adjusted profit side-by-side gives management a clearer picture of value creation under evolving market rules.

Table 1. Traditional KPIs versus Carbon-Adjusted Leadership Metrics
Traditional Focus New Leadership Metric Why It Matters
Specific energy consumption Emissions intensity (kg CO2/t cement) Directly linked to future CCTS and CBAM costs
Kiln utilisation Carbon-adjusted contribution margin Reveals true value of incremental volume
Clinker factor Share of lower-carbon products sold (incl. LC3) Measures commercial success of the transition
Power cost per tonne Effective carbon cost per tonne sold Expose hidden liabilities
Absolute EBITDA Carbon-adjusted EBITDA + green premium Aligning profit with future market reality

LC3: Technical foundations and performance advantages
LC3 is a ternary blended cement that typically combines approximately 50 per cent clinker, 30 per cent calcined clay, 15 per cent limestone and 5 per cent gypsum (the classic LC3-50 formulation). The decisive technical advantage is that clay is calcined at 700–850 °C, far below the 1,450 °C required for clinker production. This lower temperature, together with the substantial reduction in clinker content, delivers CO2 reductions of 30–40 per cent relative to ordinary Portland cement (OPC).
Chemistry is synergistic. Calcined kaolinitic clay (metakaolin) reacts with calcium hydroxide from clinker hydration and with limestone to form additional C-A-S-H gel and carboaluminate phases. These phases densify the microstructure, reduce porosity and improve durability.
Field experience shows superior resistance to chloride ingress, sulphate attack and alkali–silica reaction. Early-age strength can match OPC with high-reactivity clays; later-age strengths routinely meet 42.5 and 52.5 grade requirements.
Importantly, LC3 does not require high-purity kaolin. Clays with 40 per cent or even lower kaolinite content can be activated successfully, expanding raw-material availability across India. Calcination can use adapted rotary kilns or dedicated flash calciners, making the technology compatible with existing plant infrastructure and far less capital-intensive than carbon capture.
Economic analyses show that LC3 can be produced at equal or lower cost than OPC in many locations because of reduced energy demand and cheaper clay. Life-cycle assessments consistently report 30–40 per cent lower embodied CO2 per tonne of cement.
Table 2. Comparative profile: OPC versus LC3-50
Parameter OPC LC3-50
Typical clinker content ~95 per cent ~50 per cent
CO2 emissions (relative) Baseline (≈0.85 t CO2/t cement process + fuel) 30–40 per cent lower
Clay calcination temperature Not applicable 700–850 °C
Key hydration products C-S-H, portlandite, ettringite C-A-S-H + carboaluminates
Chloride & sulphate resistance Good Superior
Production cost potential Baseline Equal or lower in most locations
Infrastructure compatibility Existing High (minor adaptations)

In India, commercial adoption has begun in earnest. JK Cement commenced the first commercial production of LC3 in the Indian subcontinent at its Mangrol plant in Rajasthan in 2025 under BIS standard IS 18189.
By early 2026, approximately 2,000 tonnes had been produced and sold, avoiding an estimated 500 tonnes of CO2. JK Lakshmi Cement followed with commercial launch of its Green PRO LC3 grade from the Jaykaypuram plant. As of mid-2026, two producers are supplying LC3 to the market. The first large-scale infrastructure application is the Noida International Airport (Jewar), where LC3 was used in the runway and a building complex, demonstrating full constructability and performance under demanding conditions. These early volumes are still small relative to national cement demand, but they mark the critical transition from pilot to commercial reality. Companies that scale capacity now will be positioned to capture both CCTS credits and emerging green-procurement demand.

Why the shift is accelerating
According to the World Bank’s State and Trends of Carbon Pricing 2026, direct carbon pricing now covers nearly 30 per cent of global greenhouse-gas emissions and generated more than US$107 billion in public revenue in 2025. The average global carbon price stands at approximately US$21 per tonne, although regional prices vary widely.
In Europe, the EU ETS price has traded near €80–85 per tonen in mid-2026. Free allocation for cement is being withdrawn in parallel with CBAM. European producers therefore face a clear signal: every tonne of avoided CO2 improves both compliance and competitiveness. Holcim has scaled calcined-clay production, including Europe’s first dedicated line at Saint-Pierre-la-Cour (France) and a second line in the Czech Republic (2026). Heidelberg Materials, Cementir (FUTURECEM) and others have commercialised low-clinker calcined-clay blends across multiple markets, showing that carbon-adjusted profitability is already reshaping capital allocation in the world’s most mature carbon market.India’s CCTS is now operational. Binding emission intensity targets apply to 186 cement facilities for FY 2025–26 and FY 2026–27. Average required reductions for integrated plants are modest (around 2.7 per cent by FY 2027), yet the direction is clear.
Trading of Carbon Credit Certificates is expected in the second half of 2026, with early prices likely in the `800–1,500 per tonne range. Plants that outperform targets can sell credits; those that underperform must buy them or face compensation. Cement is well positioned to be a net supplier of credits if clinker factor continues to fall through LC3 and other low-clinker systems.

Way forward for India
India starts from a strong baseline, world-class energy efficiency and a clinker factor already lower than the global average. The next competitive frontier is the deliberate reduction of process emissions through clinker substitution at scale. LC3 is uniquely suited to Indian conditions because suitable clays are widely distributed, the technology fits existing kiln and grinding infrastructure, and the resulting product can meet the performance demands of both infrastructure and building construction.
A practical national pathway contains five interlocking elements:

  1. Standards and acceptance: Accelerated finalisation and promotion of BIS specifications for calcined-clay and limestone–calcined-clay cements will remove a key barrier to commercial uptake. Alignment with European practice (EN 197-5) can facilitate knowledge transfer and export readiness.
  2. Supply-chain development: Investment in flash calcination capacity and systematic characterisation of regional clay deposits will secure reliable, low-cost feedstock. Existing rotary kilns can be adapted for initial volumes while dedicated calciners are built.
  3. Incentive alignment: Part of variable compensation for plant managers, sales teams and senior leadership should be linked to emissions intensity reduction and to the volume of lower-carbon products (including LC3) sold. Without this link, traditional volume and cost targets will continue to dominate behaviour.
  4. Product-level carbon accounting: Reliable measurement of emissions intensity at the individual cement grade level, supported by third-party verification where required, is essential for both CCTS compliance and credible green claims.
  5. Demand-side pull: Green public procurement policies that specify maximum embodied-carbon thresholds for major infrastructure projects will create a predictable market for LC3 and other low-carbon cements, accelerating scale and cost reduction.
    Companies that treat LC3 as a strategic product line rather than a niche offering will be better positioned to generate surplus Carbon Credit Certificates, capture any emerging green premium, and protect margins as carbon costs rise.

Organisational changes required
Technical capability alone is insufficient. Three organisational shifts are required.
Daily management: Emissions intensity must appear on the same daily and monthly dashboards as heat consumption, power consumption and utilization. Plant reviews should examine both conventional and carbon-adjusted results.
Incentives: A meaningful portion of bonuses for plant heads, technical teams and sales leadership should be tied to lower emissions intensity and successful commercialisation of LC3 and other low-carbon grades.
Commercial approach: Sales teams need clear volume and pricing targets for lower-carbon products, supported by technical service that helps customers specify and place the material correctly. Without commercial pull, excellent technical performance remains under-utilised.

Table 3. Three-stage roadmap to carbon-adjusted profitability
Time Horizon Priority Actions Expected Outcome
Next 12 months Add emissions intensity to plant dashboards; establish internal carbon price; initiate LC3 pilot production and customer trials Visibility and early organisational learning
12–24 months Revise incentive systems; scale LC3 and other low-carbon grades to key accounts; secure third-party verification capability People and sales aligned with carbon goals
24–36 months Embed carbon-adjusted metrics in board reporting and capital allocation; expand calcined-clay capacity Full system integration and competitive advantage

Questions senior leaders should ask
Boards can accelerate the transition by insisting on answers to a short list of questions:
• Is our carbon-adjusted profit improving, stable or declining relative to conventional EBITDA?
• Did recent volume growth improve or worsen our emissions intensity?
• What share of sales already comes from lower-carbon products, including LC3, and what is the trajectory?
• How exposed is our capital expenditure plan to rising carbon costs under CCTS and potential CBAM-related requirements?
• Do our incentive systems still reward only volume and cost, or have they been updated to include carbon performance?
Treating carbon with the same seriousness as energy cost or kiln utilization does not diminish operational excellence; it expands the definition of excellence to match the new competitive reality.

Looking ahead
By 2030 the gap between leading and lagging cement companies will not be decided by who records the lowest specific heat consumption. It will be decided by who delivers the strongest carbon-adjusted profits.
Absolute emissions may still rise as national production grows. That is not the issue. Companies that reduce intensity year after year and successfully sell cleaner products will pull ahead in both domestic and export markets. Those that do not will fall behind, even if their traditional efficiency numbers look strong.
Operational excellence built the Indian cement industry. It remains the foundation. It is no longer the complete picture. Carbon-adjusted profitability is the clearer measure of success.
LC3 is not a distant technology. It is available now. It cuts CO3 by 30–40 per cent, works with existing plants, and is already in commercial production in India. Companies that treat it as a strategic product, not a pilot, will protect their margins and generate tradable credits.
Leaders who act now will place carbon metrics on daily dashboards, link incentives to intensity reduction and LC3 sales, invest in calcined-clay capacity, and build commercial capability to sell lower-carbon products. They will shape the next chapter of the industry.

References

  1. World Bank. (2026). State and Trends of Carbon Pricing 2026. Washington, DC: World Bank Group.
  2. International Carbon Action Partnership (ICAP). (2026). India Carbon Credit Trading Scheme – Status and Coverage. Berlin: ICAP.
  3. Ministry of Environment, Forest and Climate Change / Bureau of Energy Efficiency. (2025). Greenhouse Gases Emission Intensity Target Rules, 2025. New Delhi: Government of India.
  4. Scrivener, K., Martirena, F., Bishnoi, S., & Maity, S. (2018). Calcined clay limestone cements (LC3). Cement and Concrete Research, 114, 49–56.
  5. RMI. (2024). The Business Case for LC3. Rocky Mountain Institute.
  6. European Commission. (2026). EU Emissions Trading System – Allowance Price Data and Free Allocation Phase-out Schedule. Brussels.
  7. Holcim. (2025–2026). Scaling Calcined Clay for Sustainable Building – Corporate Updates on European and Latin American Capacity. Zurich: Holcim Ltd.
  8. LC3 Project / EPFL. (2026). LC3 – A Guide to Best Practices for Scalable, Affordable and Sustainable Low-Carbon Building. Lausanne: École Polytechnique Fédérale de Lausanne.
  9. Business Today / Industry Reports. (2026). First Large-Scale LC3 Application at Noida International Airport, Jewar. New Delhi.
  10. NITI Aayog / Industry Analyses. (2026). Roadmap and Baseline Performance Indicators for the Indian Cement Sector. New Delhi.
  11. Springer / Innovative Infrastructure Solutions. (2026). LC3 Systems: A Review of Chemistry, Performance, Durability and Sustainability toward Market Adoption.
  12. Cementir Holding / Industry Sources. (2025–2026). FUTURECEM and Related Low-Clinker Technologies in Europe.
  13. Climate Risk Horizons & Independent Analyses. (2026). Assessment of Emission Intensity Targets under India’s CCTS for Cement and Other Hard-to-Abate Sectors.
  14. GCCA / TERI. (Various years). Decarbonization Roadmaps for the Indian Cement Industry.
  15. EN 197-5:2021. Cement – Part 5: Portland-composite cement CEM II/C-M and Composite cement CEM VI. European Committee for Standardization.

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Concrete

More Oversight Makes Cement Plants Less Safe

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Dijam Panigrahi makes a counterintuitive but data-backed argument that routing every sensor alert through human approval does not make cement plants safer.

India’s cement industry has spent the last two years wiring kilns, mills and coolers with sensors and automated control systems, and the safety case for doing so is strong on paper. Contract workers still make up the majority of the industry’s workforce, and fatal accidents remain a recurring problem. The Indian National Cement Workers Federation has noted that around 83 per cent of workers in the sector hold precarious positions, a fact that resurfaced after an oxygen cylinder explosion killed three contract workers at a plant in Chhattisgarh.
Industry tallies compiled by IndustriALL found cement plants recorded at least seventeen accidents in one year with 21 workers killed, and ten accidents the following year with nine killed, most of them contract staff. Automated monitoring, in theory, closes that gap. A sensor never gets complacent and never skips a check because a shift is short staffed.
However, plants that respond by routing every anomaly reading to a person for approval are quietly building a system that fails the same way understaffing does. When operators receive dozens of flagged deviations a shift, most of them minor, they learn a simple lesson: the fastest way through the queue is to approve without reading closely. The safety benefit disappears, not because the technology failed, but because the humans supervising it adapted to the volume.

Why alerts get ignored
A study cited by manufacturing technology publisher Applied SmartFactory found more than 95 per cent of alarms in a semiconductor fab were low priority, and only about 4 per cent ever triggered an action, with just 100 out of 5,000 alarms accounting for 70 per cent of all alarm activity. The mechanism is the same whether the trigger is a vibration sensor or an AI model flagging a kiln temperature swing. Once the ratio of noise to signal crosses a threshold, workers stop treating the system as a decision aid and start treating it as a formality to clear.
The scale of AI deployment underway makes this more than a theoretical risk. Stanford’s 2026 AI Index Report found organisational adoption of AI has reached 88 per cent, even as documented AI incidents rose to 362 in 2025, up sharply from 233 the year before, according to analysis of the report. The Index also found only about a third of organisations have adopted a formal governance framework, with NIST’s AI Risk Management Framework cited by 33 per cent and ISO/IEC 42001 cited by 36 per cent.
Most manufacturers are deploying monitoring systems faster than they are building the judgment for when a flagged event actually needs a person’s attention. In India, plants run by JK Cement have begun pairing CCTV feeds with AI to define safe zones around heavy machinery, a promising direction that still depends on operators trusting and reading the alerts the system generates.

A three-tier model for cement plant
The fix is not less monitoring or more monitoring. It is classifying decisions by risk and by novelty, rather than treating human oversight as a single switch that is either on or off. A workable model sorts factory floor events into three tiers.
The first tier, proceed, covers deviations the plant has seen before that fall within known safe bounds, such as a kiln feed rate adjustment within an established range. These should run without a stop for approval, because routing them to a person only trains that person to click through.
The second tier, pause, covers events that are unusual but not yet dangerous, such as a vibration reading trending toward a limit or a fuel blend shifting outside its typical mix. These warrant a brief human check before the system proceeds, giving an operator the chance to apply judgment the model does not yet have.
The third tier, escalate, covers events that are both high risk and unfamiliar, such as a pressure reading combined with a temperature spike that has no close precedent in the plant’s history. These should stop the process entirely and require a decision from someone with the authority to shut down a line.

Who should set the threshold
Where these tiers get drawn matters as much as the framework itself. Threshold setting is frequently handed to the vendor supplying the monitoring software or to a plant’s IT department, both of which understand the technology but not the specific tolerances of a given kiln, mill or line. Operations staff, who know that a particular grinding unit runs hotter under monsoon humidity or that a calciner behaves differently after a refractory reline, are better positioned to calibrate what counts as routine on their own equipment.
Handing threshold ownership to operations does not remove IT or vendors from the process, but it puts the calibration decision closest to the people who live with its consequences on the floor.

Signals that oversight is actually working
A few concrete indicators reveal whether a monitoring setup is functioning as intended or simply providing the appearance of safety. The escalation rate over time is the first: a rate that stays flat or climbs slowly as operations mature is healthy, while one that spikes and then falls sharply often means operators have started overriding the system rather than engaging with it. Time to resolution is the second: escalations that take progressively longer to close suggest fatigue or confusion about ownership, not diligence. The third, and most telling, is how accurate the system’s own uncertainty estimates turn out to be, meaning whether events flagged as high risk actually correlated with real incidents, and whether events waved through stayed incident free. A system whose escalations do not track with actual outcomes trains operators toward the same complacency that unmonitored equipment produces.
None of this argues against automation in Indian cement manufacturing, where a labor structure built on contract work and a track record of serious accidents make better monitoring an urgent need. It argues for treating human oversight as a design problem with three distinct settings, rather than a single
dial turned up whenever a plant wants to look safer on paper.

About the author:
Dijam Panigrahi, Co-founder and COO, GridRaster, is a spatial computing platform for industrial enterprises and manufacturers.

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Concrete

The biggest gap arises from inconsistent leadership

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Anuj Kumar Mathur, Safety Consultant, stresses on the importance of closing the enduring gap between what safety systems say on paper and what actually happens on the plant floor.

Robust safety manuals, certified PPE and digital monitoring systems mean little if the culture on the plant floor does not enforce them. Safety Consultant Anuj Kumar Mathur has spent enough time in high-risk operations to know precisely where that gap opens and why it persists. In this exclusive interaction, he suggests feasible ways to strengthen the safety culture at a manufacturing unit.

Having led safety across high-risk fuel operations, what lessons can the cement industry adopt to strengthen its safety culture beyond regulatory compliance?
Beyond regulatory compliance, the cement industry should embed visible leadership commitment, proactive risk assessment, process safety management, strong contractor control, near-miss learning, and employee engagement to build a resilient safety culture that prioritises prevention, operational discipline and continuous improvement over mere compliance.

As cement plants become increasingly automated and digitally connected, how should organisations redefine their approach to process safety and operational risk?
As cement plants become increasingly automated, organisations should integrate process safety with digital risk management by strengthening cybersecurity, real-time monitoring, predictive maintenance, management of change and workforce competency to ensure safe, reliable and resilient operations.

What are the most common gaps between having robust safety systems on paper and achieving consistent safety performance on the ground?
The biggest gap arises from inconsistent leadership commitment on ground, weak safety culture, inadequate supervision, poor risk communication, insufficient workforce engagement specially, ineffective training and failure to translate procedures into disciplined execution, accountability and continuous monitoring at the operational level.

How can cement manufacturers better integrate contractor safety, leadership accountability and workforce behaviour to build a truly zero-harm workplace?
Manufacturers can achieve a zero-harm workplace by enforcing uniform safety standards for employees and contractors, strengthening leadership accountability, promoting proactive hazard reporting, enhancing competency through continuous training and fostering a culture where safe behaviour is recognised, expected and consistently practiced

What emerging technologies and safety practices do you believe will have the greatest impact on risk prevention in cement manufacturing over the next decade?
Artificial intelligence, IoT-enabled monitoring, predictive analytics, digital twins, wearable safety devices, drones, robotics and advanced process automation will significantly enhance hazard detection, predictive maintenance, real-time risk management, and worker protection, enabling safer and more resilient cement manufacturing.
IoT-enabled monitoring is the use of interconnected sensors and smart devices to continuously collect, transmit and analyse real-time data from equipment, processes and the work environment. This enables early detection of unsafe conditions, equipment failures, or abnormal operating parameters, allowing timely intervention before incidents occur.
In cement manufacturing, IoT-enabled monitoring can be used for:
• Monitoring kiln, crusher, and mill temperatures, pressures, and vibrations.
• Detecting overheating of bearings and motors to prevent failures.
• Monitoring dust concentration, gas leaks (CO, SO2, NOx), and oxygen levels.
• Tracking conveyor belt alignment and condition.
• Monitoring structural health of silos and
storage facilities.
• Tracking worker location and exposure to hazardous environments using wearable devices.
• Providing real-time alerts and predictive maintenance recommendations.


Benefits:
• Early hazard detection
• Reduced equipment downtime
• Improved process safety and reliability
• Lower maintenance costs
• Enhanced regulatory compliance
• Better decision-making through real-time data and analytics
In simple terms, IoT-enabled monitoring transforms periodic manual inspections into continuous, real-time surveillance of plant safety and equipment health.

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